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A
mAbstract
We examine two impacts of international emigration on the evolution of the
institutions in the origin countries. The first impact concerns the influence of
emigration per se (i.e. people who left the country can voice more or less from abroad).
The second impact relates to the transfer of the norms of the host country to the
home country. The existence of both impacts is confirmed using different indicators of
institutional quality. The effects appear stronger when skilled emigration is considered.
The main conclusions are robust to alternative econometric methods and to the use of
subsamples involving developing countries only.
JEL codes: F22, J24, J61, J64.
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Labor migration is a central feature of the current international economy inducing high
attention from both academics and policymakers. The most recent available estimates
suggest that by 2000 there were 60 millions migrants (i.e., aged 25 or more) living in the
OECD area of which 20 millions are highly skilled migrants (i.e., foreign-born workers
with tertiary education). Developing countries are major suppliers of such migration.
They accounted for 64.5 percent of total immigrants and 61.6 percent of skilled immi-
grants in the OECD. This is 15 percentage points higher than in 1990 (Docquier et al.,
2007). An intense debate is taking place on the causes and consequences of such a
phenomenon. Thanks to the availability of new data sets on migration, a new generation
of research is now able to address empirically various aspects of migration. An important
part of this literature focuses on skilled migration and brain drain.
The recent literature starts pointing to channels through which the brain drain may
positively affect the sending economy Docquier and Sekkat (2006). These include a set of
“feedback effects” such as remittances, return migration, the creation of business and
trade networks, and the effect of migration prospects on education. Remittances often
represent a major source of income in developing countries: about $US 150 billion in
2004, roughly the same amount than foreign direct investments and about three times as
large as the official development aid (World Bank, 2006). Although the magnitude of re-
turn migration is difficult to measure, the fact that migrants accumulate knowledge and
financial capital in rich countries before spending the rest of their career in their origin2013 Beine and Sekkat; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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2003 and Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996).
Prospects of migration can also induce more people to invest in education at home
(Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1998; Vidal, 1998 and Beine et al., 2001 and 2008). More-
over, the creation of migrants’ networks can facilitate the movement of goods, factors, and
ideas between the migrants’ host and home countries.1 (Rauch and Trindade 2002) have
found that ethnic Chinese networks affect trade in differentiated goods. In the same vein,
(Docquier and Lodigiani 2006) find that skilled migration has a stimulating effect on FDI.
So far, the reported findings deal with the economic impacts of brain drain on the origin
country. A very recent strand of the literature is now focusing on the non-economic im-
pacts on the origin country. Such impacts cover a wide range of dimensions including eth-
nic discrimination (Docquier and Rapoport, 2003), fertility (Beine et al., 2012), corruption
(Mariani, 2007) and democracy (Spilimbergo, 2009 and Docquier et al., 2009).
The present paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the quality of “market
friendly” institutions as measured by Kufmann et al. (1999). These are among the most
widely used measures of the quality of institutions. The relevance of such focus is based
on the following findings of the literature. First, there is the primary role of the quality
of institutions in shaping economic growth. Second, there is a growing evidence that
institutions, or at least a part of them, are not frozen but could be changed and that
human capital can play an important role in this respect. Finally, the recent literature
supports the existence of feedbacks from emigration to the origin country. These as-
pects are examined in the Section 2.
On the light of these findings, we address the three following questions: i) What is the
impact of international migration on the quality of institutions in the sending country? ii)
Is the level of education of emigrants important for such an impact to take place? and iii)
Does a change in the quality of institution in the home country depend on their quality in
the host country i.e. is there a transfer of norms? The answer to each of these questions
has two components: existence or not of an impact and the sign of the impact. The possi-
bility of a positive or a negative feedback of emigration on the home country’s institutions
depends on these two components. For instance, emigration may have a negative impact
if individuals that can effectively voice in favor of an improvement in the quality of institu-
tions tend to leave the country. The impact might be positive if the same individuals rely
on the liberal climate in the host country in order to advocate for an improvement in the
origin country. In a similar vein, the feedback through the transfer of norms can only be
positive if the host country benefits from good quality of institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main relevant fin-
dings in the literature that motivate the question of the paper. Section 3 presents the econo-
metric methodology, the data, and the construction of the various indicators to be used and
discusses their main features. Section 4 focuses on the results and Section 5 concludes.
2. The existing literature
Before looking the specific literature devoted to feedback effects of diasporas in terms of
home country institutions, it is important to summarize the main conclusions of related
strands of the economic literature. First, there is an important literature showing the im-
portance of good and market friendly institutions on growth.2 Second, there is some com-
pelling evidence that institutions are not frozen and can evolve over time. Among the
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of higher level of GDP per capita and human capital accumulation play a prominent role.3
Beside this, a recent growing strand of the literature has been concerned by the possible
role played by international migration on the evolution of the home country institutions.
Casual observation suggests a link between migration and home country institutions.
Many governments have actively financed and hosted foreign students with the objective
of creating close ties with future ruling classes and spreading specific ideas. For instance,
the former Patrice Lumumba University was founded in 1960 with the explicit mandate to
prepare future socialist leaders in Africa. In a similar vein, some Islamic countries host
and fund foreign Muslim students as a way of forming future leaders in Islamic countries.
Beside such observation, there are economic mechanisms by which migration can affect
home country institutions 4.
A first mechanism draws on (Hirschman’s 1970) “Exit and Voice” model. In that frame-
work, a high degree of exit can reduce the tax base so that the government finds it more
profitable to reduce rent-seeking to keep people inside the country even at a higher total
cost of controlling voicing. A second mechanism is based on the removal of the assumption
that individuals abroad cannot voice. However, they may put pressure on international insti-
tutions and foreign states to push their local government to change. (Shain and Barth 2003)
identified the following active behavior helping the achievement of such objective. Migrants
or Diasporas can organize as interest groups in order to influence the foreign policy of their
host vis-à-vis their home countries. They can also be active actors, influencing the foreign
policies of the home country by achieving economic and political power. Finally, Diasporas
can reinforce its influence on host country leaders through, for instance, investments in na-
tional projects or political contributions.
Beside exit and voice mechanisms, Diasporas can influence home countries institutions
in other ways. They can play the role of transnational transporters of cultures, promote
transnational ties, act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host countries,
and transmit the values of pluralism and democracy as well as the entrepreneurial spirit
and skills to their home countries (see Shain and Barth, 2003 for further analysis Beside
their impact on education and investment, remittances might affect the origin country
institutions. They can represent resources that strengthen individuals vis-à-vis state actors
and encourage them to vote for non ruling parties and hold local leaders accountable
(Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010).
Empirical evidence supports the role of Diasporas in influencing the host country fo-
reign policy. Lahiriy and Raimondos-Miller (2000) reports striking relationship between
the distribution of aid and the ethnic composition of some countries which suggests
that Diasporas could influence the distribution of international aid. For example, a large
proportion of aid from Germany goes to Turkey. Similar observation can be made for
U.K. aid to India and U.S.A aid to Israel
While the above empirical evidence supports that Diasporas can influence the host
country foreign policy, it is silent on whether such influence translates in a change of the
home country institutions. Although not addressing this question directly, other type of
evidence is relevant in our context. (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010) examined how
international migration acts as a force of democratic diffusion using the results of a na-
tional survey in Mexico conducted in June, 2006. Their findings support the existence of
transfer of norms from the host to the home country via migration. They identified three
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communication between migrants and people in the origin country, and iii) migrants net-
works. (Spilimbergo 2009) dealt with a similar issue. Focusing on the impact of foreign-
educated individuals on democracy in their home countries, the author found that such
individuals, indeed, promote democracy in their home country. (Constant and Tien 2010)
find a similar effect of foreign education of African leaders in attracting FDI. Using cross
countries data, (Docquier et al. 2009) and Beine et al. (2012) investigated the possibility of
transfer of other aspects of norms. The former, found a positive effect of the total emigra-
tion rate on democracy and civil liberties in the origin country while the latter showed that
international migration results in a transfer of fertility norms from host to migrants’ home
countries. While the above evidence rests mainly on macroeconomic estimates, there is
also recent evidence on the microeconomic side. Bertoli and Marchetta (2011) document
the role of fertility norms in shaping home fertility behavior in the case of Egyptian mi-
grants returning from Gulf countries.
3. Methodology, data and descriptive analysis
3.1 Econometric specification
In order to estimate the impact of migration on institution quality, we need to consider
first the econometric specification that best describes the relationship between migra-
tion and institutional quality. Obviously, institution quality might be explained by a
large set of observable but also unobservable factors. Failure to account for these fac-
tors is likely to induce large biases in the way migration affects institutional quality.
Therefore, for a given norm and a given destination we estimate the following dy-
namic panel data model:
ΔIit ¼ αþ ρIit−1 þ θmit−1 þ γNit−1 þ δHit−1 þ εit ð1Þ
where i refers to origin country, t refers to time. Iit and Δ Iit refer to the level of institution
in country I at time t, and to its change with respect to the previous period (year) respect-
ively. This specification allows for a catching-up process in institutional quality across
countries through the parameter ρ. In addition to the catching-up process, Equation (1)
relates the change in institutional quality to the past values of the emigration rate of origin
country i (mit-1) the past level of institutional quality in the host country (denoted Nit-1)
and the past level of human capital in country i (Hit-1). The variable Nit-1 captures of the
norm related to institutional quality that could be transmitted by its migrants abroad (the
so called Diaspora externality in terms of norm).
The underlying catching up process in the quality of institutions is related to several
phenomena. First, there is a long-run global improvement of institutional quality in deve-
loping countries (see Rodrik, 2000). One of the reasons is related to the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the gradual adoption by former socialist regimes of Western institutions (Sachs
and Warner, 1995). Second, the values of institutional quality being bounded at the bot-
tom and at the top of the world distribution, there is a natural trend for countries to con-
verge towards the mean of the distribution. This is especially the case for countries with
very low initial values in terms of institutional quality.
An important feature of this specification is that migration will affect the change in
institutional quality and not its level. Since we have two years of the data, this model is
equivalent to a panel data model with fixed effects. These fixed effects capture the role of
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misspecification affecting the results. The past levels of variables refer to 1990 while the
change in institutional quality is between 2000 and 1990. In order to emphasize the role of
education in the way migration affects institutions, each equation is estimated using total
migration and skilled migration respectively.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Institutional data
We use the (Kaufmann et al. 1999) data. They report six indicators of governance for a
large set of developed and developing countries. A higher level of the indicator means bet-
ter quality of institutions. The six indicators are voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The
indicators are available over the 1994–2009 period. We use two data points for each indi-
cator, i.e. the one related to 1994 and 2004. This allows us computing the change in gov-
ernance quality over the 1994–2004 period that can be related to migration rates and
country’s norms computed in 1990.
3.2.2 Migration data
The estimation of equation (1) requires the use of migration data. Three important features
are needed to that respect. First, we need data covering a large number of origin countries
as well as most OECD countries in terms of destination. Second, the migration data need
to give migration stocks broken down by the education level of the migrants in order to
isolate skilled and unskilled emigration for each origin country. Third, in order to compute
the institutional norms, we need to rely on bilateral stocks, i.e. stocks that are specific to
each migration corridor. In order to match those requirements, we use the (Docquier and
Marfouk 2006) (release 2.1) data set which is up to now the most advanced dataset com-
plying with those requirement. The (Docquier and Marfouk 2006) data provide for two
separate years (1990 and 2000) the bilateral stocks for three education levels. They cover
all origin countries and 30 OECD destinations countries.
3.2.3 Migration variables
To address the three questions presented in Section 1 (i.e. the impact of international mi-
gration on institutions, the role of the level of education of emigrants and transfer of
norms), we construct four variables. The first one is the total emigration rates for each ori-
gin country defined as the total stock of migrants abroad over the total working population
(total labor force). The second is similar except that it focuses on skilled migration. It is de-
fined as the stock of migrants with tertiary education over the skilled labor force (labor
force with tertiary education). The third and four variables concern the norm. They are de-
fined as the weighted average of the levels of governance quality across destination coun-
tries. One uses the weights based on total migration while the other uses skilled migration.








Ms ijt denotes the stock of migrants from origin country i in country j at time t with edu-cation level s and LFsit is the labor force in country i at time t with education level s.
Beine and Sekkat IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:9 Page 6 of 19
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/9Regarding norms, we assume that migrants adopt the level of the quality of institu-
tions prevailing in the destination countries. The norm adopted by migrants from
country i to different destination, denoted NAsi;t is the weighted average of the levels of
institutions quality across destination countries. It depends on the education level of
migrants denoted by s. The weights are the shares of the migrant stock from country i










As pointed out in the introduction, while emigration could affect the quality of thehome country institutions, the effect might be positive or negative depending on
whether the quality of institutions in the host country is better or worst than in the
host country. To allow for possible negative or positive transfer of norms, we use the
difference in the quality of institutions in the origin and host countries. Moreover, since
the norm is transmitted to country i through migrants, we assume that the transmis-
sion depends on the intensity of emigration, i.e. depends on the emigration rate of
workers with skill level s:
Nsi;t ¼ msit NAsi;t−Isit
 
ð4Þ
Note that we could consider different combinations for the norms absorbed by themigrants and the way they are transmitted. For instance, we can figure out that the pol-
itical norm is absorbed by all migrants but that the norm is only transmitted by edu-
cated migrants, considering only the tertiary education level. This case corresponds for
instance to a situation where only skilled migrants have influence on their home coun-
try and can transmit the norms back at home. Alternatively, the norm can be assumed
to be absorbed by skilled migrants but transmitted by all migrants. We assume in what
follows that the absorption and transmission of the norms involve the same skill level.
In order to illustrate the constructed variables, we consider the Algerian case. The
Algerian migration pattern is highly dominated by emigration to Europe, and in particular
to the former colonizer France. The global emigration rate (msit ) in 1990 was respectively
5.3% and 8.3% for all migrants and skilled ones respectively. In 2000, the respective num-
bers were 4.4% and 9.4%, meaning an increase in the proportion of skilled Algerian resid-
ing abroad. France represents the main destination. In 1990, 90% of the Algerian migrants
were located in France, against 858% for skilled ones. In 2000, the respective numbers
were 84% and 59.5%. Therefore, the norms (NAsi;t ) which are transmitted to Algeria are
close to the institutional values Ijt observed for France. For Voice and accountability, the
French values are 1.41 and 0.98 for 1990 and 2000 respectively. The Algerian values for
that measure are −1.23 and −0.34 respectively, featuring an improvement in that measure
over the nineties. In 1990 and 2000, the global norm in terms of voice and accountability
transmitted back to Algeria was 1.34 and 1.31 respectively. This means that for both years,





differential being higher in 1990 than in 2000.




The extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media.
Kaufmann
(1999)
Political stability The likelihood that the government will not be destabilized or overthrown by






The quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
Kaufmann
(1999)
Regulatory quality The ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permits and promotes private sector development.
Kaufmann
(1999)
Rule of law The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,





The extent to which public power is not exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by
elites and private interests.
Kaufmann
(1999)
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Tables 1 and Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory
variables that are included in Equation 1. Table 2 gives for all institutional variables the
average values, their standard deviations, the minimum and maximum values across
countries as well as the number of available observations. The statistics show that the
variability of the data relative to the institutional data is quite different across institu-
tional variables. In particular, it is obvious for the institutional norms. For two institu-
tional dimensions, i.e. political stability and rule of law, the variability across origin
countries of the migrants is quite low. This reflects that the migrants from most origin
countries tend to concentrate in “politically stable” countries and countries “enforcing”
the rule of the law; which could make sense.5 The variability of the norms for the other
institutional dimension is higher.
Figure 1 compares the extent of the brain drain and low skilled migration across the
World’s region in 2000. For that purpose we sue the global emigration rates by origin
country extracted from the Docquier and Marfouk database (2006). The emigration rates
are computed for all destination countries included in the database, i.e. mostly OECD
countries. Then we average those emigration rates for different various large origin re-
gions that correspond to the World Bank classification. The emigration rates for the un-
skilled migrants are given by the rates for the workers with primary education only, while
the brain drain rates are those for the migrants with tertiary education level.
Figure 1 shows that the rates of low skilled migration are always lower than the brain
drain confirming that human capital formation is positively associated with higher migra-
tion prospects. Among the six regions under consideration, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and
Latin America are the most affected by the brain drain. The MENA ranks third; preceding
Asia and Europe. It also experiences higher brain drain than the world average.
Quality of institutions
As explained in Section 3.2, we use the (Kaufmann et al. 1999) data set which reports 6
indicators of governance for a large set of developed and developing countries. To save on
space we focus on two of these indicators in this section. The aim is to highlight differences
Table 2 Descriptive statistics regarding the governance variables
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Number of observations
Voice and accountability
Δ Iit 0.000 0.404 −1.285 1.570 190
Iit-1 −0.040 1.006 −1.983 1.712 190
Nit-1 Total migration 0.156 0.297 0.000 2.287 190
Nit-1 Skilled migration 0.160 0.310 0.001 2.480 190
Political stability
Δ Iit −0.429 0.957 −3.049 1.277 178
Iit-1 0.289 0.123 0.171 0.660 178
Nit-1 Total migration 0.378 0.006 0.350 0.423 178
Nit-1 Skilled migration 0.378 0.005 0.362 0.420 178
Government effectiveness
Δ Iit 0.001 0.374 −1.067 1.042 178
Iit-1 −0.045 1.009 −1.799 2.534 178
Nit-1 Total migration 0.190 0.472 −0.024 2.932 178
Nit-1 Skilled migration 0.196 0.489 −0.006 3.298 178
Regulatory quality
Δ Iit −0.172 0.123 −0.479 −0.048 180
Iit-1 0.363 0.145 0.219 0.670 180
Nit-1 Total migration −0.001 0.032 −0.185 0.083 180
Nit-1 Skilled migration −0.001 0.032 −0.185 0.083 180
Rule of law
Δ Iit −0.386 1.089 −2.954 1.855 165
Iit-1 0.272 0.170 0.149 0.793 165
Nit-1 Total migration 0.312 0.004 0.301 0.334 165
Nit-1 Skilled migration 0.311 0.002 0.305 0.328 165
Control of corruption
Δ Iit −0.037 0.450 −1.690 0.921 149
Iit-1 0.010 1.084 −2.130 2.440 149
Nit-1 Total migration 2.420 0.364 1.081 2.972 149
Nit-1 Skilled migration 2.501 0.271 1.334 2.998 149
mit-1 Total migration 8.261 16.096 0.023 89.303 193
mit-1 Skilled migration 2.525 5.035 0.011 33.761 193
Hit-1 7.718 7.033 0.144 43.820 193
Notes: Iit-1 and Δ Iit refer to the (lagged) level and the change within the decade of institutional values. Nit-1 refers to the
(lagged) value of the norms in terms of the governance dimension either transmitted by all migrants or by skilled migrants
only; mit-1 refers to migration rates; Hit-1 refers to human capital levels.
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“voice and accountability” which measures the extent to which a country's citizens are able
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of
association, and a free media. The second is “control of corruption” and measures the ex-
tent to which public power is not exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Figure 2
presents World maps highlighting countries by class of quality of governance from the 0–
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Figure 1 Migration and brain drain around the world in 2000.
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centile irrespective of the indicator. Much more contrasts appear regarding developing
countries. The differences also depend on the indicator at hand. Regarding “voice and ac-
countability”, most of Latin American countries belong to percentiles 25–50 and 50–75.
None of them belongs to the percentile 0–10. The latter includes only African and Asian
countries but not all of them. When it comes to “control of corruption”, the contrast be-
tween Latin America on one hand and Africa and Asia on the other hand is less pronounced.
Some Latin American countries downgrade while some African and Asian upgrade. Similar
upgrading holds for the MENA but the contrasts inside the region remain.
5. The results
In this section, we present different sets of estimation results. The first set is based on
the application of the OLS method to Equation (1) using the whole sample of devel-
oped and developing countries. However, since some econometric issues may affect the
quality of the OLS estimates, they are discussed and addressed using other estimation
methods i.e. SURE and 2SLS. Finally, since for developing countries the issues of insti-
tutions and transfer of norms are more sensitive than for developed countries, we re-
run our regressions on developing countries only.
5.1 OLS estimation
This section presents and interprets the results using OLS and discusses their potential
robustness. Table 3 reports the estimation results of Equation (1) on each measure of
the quality of institutions considered separately. It also makes a distinction between
total emigration and skilled emigration. In the first set of regressions, we use the total
emigration rates. In the second set of regressions, we use skilled emigration.
The overall quality of the fit is similar for total and unskilled migration but differs
highly across indicators ranging from over 90% for “regulatory quality” to below 10%
for “voice and accountability”. The coefficient of the lagged quality of institutions is al-
ways negative and significant confirming the existence of a catch-up process in the
90th-100th Percentile 50th-75th Percentile 10th-25th Percentile
75th-90th Percentile 25th-50th Percentile 0th-10th Percentile
Figure 2 Institutional indicators over the world.
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tive and significant, confirming the importance of education in improving the quality of
institutions. Looking at our variables of interest (migration and norm), the pattern of
significant coefficients is similar for skilled and total migration.
Focusing on the coefficients of emigration, they are significant in 2 cases out of 4 in each
panel. The significant coefficients are higher in absolute value for skilled than for total mi-
gration; suggesting a higher impact of skilled migration. The coefficient is negative for
“voice and accountability”. This might be related to the exit/voice model discussed above.
Skilled emigration reduces the voicing capacity at home which weakens pressures in favor
institutional improvement. Potential voicing from abroad does not seem to compensate
for the loss in domestic capacity of voicing. For “regulatory quality”, the coefficients are
positive. Turning to the coefficients of norm, they are significant only in one case (“voice










It − 1. .072** −0.082*** −0.875*** −0.194**
(2.179) (2.362) (46.877) (4.728)
mt − 1. .968** 0.491 0.049*** 0.242
(2.121) (0.525) (4.017) (0.743)
Nt − 1. 727*** 0.005 0.148* −1.863
(2.575) (0.016) (1.803) (0.940)
Ht − 1. 121 0.164 0.086*** 1.780***
(0.301) (0.443) (5.702) (2.753)
Constant −0.046 −0.055 0.132*** −0.199***
(0.931) (1.147) (21.041) (2.483)
Observations 190 178 180 149
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.99 0.13
Skilled migration
It − 1. .072** −0.064** −0.836*** −0.184***
(2.224) (2.055) (53.580) (4.595)
mt − 1. .721*** −1.138 0.175*** −1.545
(3.874) (1.209) (5.247) (0.851)
Nt − 1. 601*** 0.273*** 0.012 0.260*
(3.974) (2.622) (0.224) (1.559)
Ht − 1. 106 0.134 0.093*** 1.759***
(0.266) (0.363) (6.319) (2.726)
Constant −0.039 −0.039 0.120*** −0.197***
(0.800) (0.852) (22.180) (2.578)
Observations 190 178 180 149
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.07 0.99 0.13
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%,** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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migration is considered. These significant coefficients are positive lending support to the
hypothesis of transfer of norm from the host to the home country.
In sum, both skilled and total migrations have an impact on the quality of home
country’s institutions but the impact of skilled migration is higher. The impact is posi-
tive except in one case: “voice and accountability”. In this case the direct effect of mi-
gration is negative but the indirect impact through the transfer of norm is still positive.
The above estimation results could, however, be impacted by two econometric issues
of particular importance in our context.
First, OLS does not account for possible sources of endogeneity. One source of
endogeneity is that under some conditions emigration rates are likely to depend on the
change in institutions. There are basically two conditions. First, institutions in origin
countries should act as push factors to emigration. For instance, low government effi-
ciency is likely to induce skilled workers willing to set up their own business to emigrate.
A second condition is that agents form expectations with respect to institutional changes.
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verse causality. Under those conditions, OLS estimates are likely to be biased.
It is not sure, however, that, in our framework, the endogeneity problem is serious
enough for the following reasons. First, our dependent variable is the change in the
quality of institutions between 1990 and 2000 while the explanatory emigration rate
pertains to 1990. Such change is not observable and unknown in 1990 and it is hard to
envisage how it can explain the stock of emigration of this year especially given that
such stock is the result of individual decision over the pre-1990 period. Second, while
expectations could play a role, the change in the quality of institutions is determined
by so many factors (especially during our period of observation which witnessed such
dramatic change as the collapse of the communist block) that it is hard to support that
such expectations were so well formed in 1990 that the resulting emigration outcome
is highly correlated with the change in the quality of institutions ten years later. Third,
the alternative to OLS estimator is the 2SLS estimator. The latter is advised only if the
loss of precision and the bias induced by relatively weak instruments are more than off-
set by the correction of the underlying OLS bias. For instance if the explanatory vari-
able are exogenous, OLS gives more consistent results. Therefore, to be sure of the
consistency of our estimates we will run exogeneity test for emigration rate and 2SLS if
exogeneity is rejected.
Second, single equation estimation does not account for possible correlation in the
εit across institutional quality measures. For instance, an important shock occurring in
a given country (say a coup) is likely to affect simultaneously a large set of institutional
quality measures (say corruption, accountability and government efficiency). In order
to account for such correlation, we re-estimate Equation (1) using SURE.
5.2 Exogeneity tests and 2SLS estimation
As discussed in Section 4.1 OLS estimates may be impacted by possible endogeneity of
emigration rates. In this section, we address this issue by first testing the exogeneity of
this variable. If it is found to be exogenous we stick to OLS results because they are
consistent. If the exogeneity hypothesis is rejected, we switch to 2SLS 6.
5.2.1 Exogeneity
In our context, we can apply the "weak exogeneity" test since inference on the emigration
coefficient only requires that emigration is not correlated with the disturbance term (Engle
et al., 1983). One simple test (see Johnston and DiNardo, 1997) follows the 2 following
steps. First, we regress the emigration on a set of exogenous variables/instruments and
collect the residuals. Second, we regress the change in the quality of institutions on a con-
stant, the emigration rate and the collected residuals. If the coefficient of the computed re-
siduals is not significantly different from zero (using the Student test, for instance),
emigration rate is considered as "weakly exogenous" with respect to the change in the
quality of institutions.
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of this procedure. With respect to the choice of in-
struments, we build on (Docquier et al. 2007). In order to fill up vacant cells in terms
of migration stocks, they use a set of variables such as colonial links or the size of the
origin country. Of course, all those variables are not eligible for our purpose since we
need to pick up determinants of migration flows and stocks that are not correlated with
Table 4 Regression of total and skilled migration on instruments (1990)
Total migration Skilled migration
Country size 0.000*** 0.000***
(2.545) (2.662)










Adjusted R2 0.19 0.24
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10% level.
** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
F test: null hypothesis all slope coefficient jointly equal to zero.
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et al. 2007). In particular the exogenous variables/instruments we include in the first
step are: country size, dummy for low income countries, dummy for tropical countries
and dummy for countries having a British legal system. For the test to be valid these
variables should be sufficiently correlated with the emigration rates i.e. they should be
strong in (Murray 2006)’s terminology. The latter suggests using the (Staiger and Stock
1997) “rule” for this purpose. Following this rule, the correlation can be considered as
high enough if the first-stage F-statistic is above 10. The results in Table 4 confirm that
this is the case.
Table 5 reports the second step of the exogeneity test. To save on space, only the coeffi-
cients of the residuals and their t-statistics are presented.7 Both for skilled and total emi-
gration, the tests do not reject the hypothesis of exogeneity for “voice and accountability”,
“regulatory quality” and “government effectiveness”. For these indicators the results of
OLS and SURE are validated. For the remaining indicator (“control of corruption”), the re-
sults are borderline. Exogeneity is rejected at the 10%. Hence the 2SLS method is used for










Coefficients 0.209 0.335 −0.037 −1.140*
t-statistics (0.437) (0.778) (0.208) (1.729)
Skilled migration
Coefficients −0.024 1.025 0.032 −3.089
t-statistics (0.018) (0.836) (0.061) (1.501)
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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The 2SLS estimation also proceeds in two steps. First, we regress the emigration rate
on a set of exogenous variables/instruments and collect the fitted series. Second, we
use the latter as explanatory variables of the change in the quality of institutions to-
gether with the other explanatory variables. Here again, the exogenous variables/instru-
ments should be enough correlated with the emigration rates (strong). Moreover, they
should be uncorrelated with the disturbances of the equation of interest (in our case,
Equation 1). Since we use the same exogenous variables as in Table 4, the instruments
are strong. To judge whether the chosen instruments are valid, (Murray 2006) suggests
using the (Sargan 1958) test. The Sargan test boils down to regress the residuals from
the second step estimation of the equation of interest on the instruments and uses the
R2 to test the significance of this regression. The test statistic is the number of observa-
tions times the R2 and has a chi-square distribution. Its degree of freedom is equal to
the number of instrument minus the number of variables to be instrumented.
Table 6 reports the results of the 2SLS estimation. The Sargan statistics is not signifi-
cant both for total and skilled migrations; meaning that instruments are not correlated
with the error term. Hence, the 2SLS estimation results of the latter are reliable. For
this indicator, the coefficients of human capital are positive and significant. The coeffi-
cients pertaining to the effect of migration are never significant.
5.3 SURE estimation
In this section, we look at the robustness of the OLS results regarding the impact of
emigration accounting for correlations between the various dimensions of institutions.
Bang and Mitra (2009) show that measures of institutions or governance are character-
ized by several dimensions that can be captured by unobserved factors. The SURE esti-
mates of the system including the three indicators, for which endogeneity was not an
issue, allow accounting for the existing correlation across residuals. They are moreTable 6 The impact of migration on the change in institutions (1990–2000) 2SLS:
Second Step
Control of corruption
Total migration Skilled migration
It − 1. .187*** −0.132***
(3.099) (2.484)
mt − 1. 186 −3.112
(0.682) (0.658)
Nt − 1. 062 0.875*
(0.107) (1.664)






Adjusted R2 0.12 0.38
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level, Sargan-test :
p-value reported, null hypothesis = validity of exclusion restriction.
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/9efficient than OLS. However, the total number of countries is constrained by the avail-
ability of all indicators for the whole sample, which leads to a decrease in the total
number of observations.
Table 7 reports the estimation results. It is organized as Table 3. Like in the latter, the
overall quality of the fit differs highly across indicators (between 90% and 10%). Almost
all the effects of total migration found in Table 3 disappear in Table 7. In contrast the
effects of skilled migration remain. The coefficients of the lagged quality of institutions
confirm the existence of a catch-up process and the coefficients of the lagged human
capital confirm the importance of education in improving the quality of institutions.
The coefficient of skilled emigration is significantly negative for “voice and accountabil-
ity” and significantly positive for “regulatory quality”. The coefficients of norm are posi-
tive and significant for “voice and accountability” and “regulatory quality”; lending
support to the hypothesis of a transfer of norm from the host to the home country.
Overall the results in Table 7 confirm our main previous findings. Skilled migration has
an impact on the quality of home country’s institutions. Such an impact is higher than
the one of total migration. The impact is positive except in one case: “voice andTable 7 The impact of migration on the change in institutions (1990–2000) SURE
Voice and accountability Government effectiveness Regulatory quality
Total migration
It − 1. .084** −0.055 −0.834***
(2.189) (1.486) (88.297)
mt − 1. .758 0.348 0.051***
(1.259) (0.392) (6.210)
Nt − 1. 607* 0.054 0.000
(1.917) (0.178) (0.010)
Ht − 1. 193 −0.043 0.098***
(0.402) (0.091) (5.981)
Constant −0.059 −0.036 0.119***
(1.105) (0.725) (27.945)
Observations 178 178 178
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.97
Skilled migration
It − 1. .081** −0.041 −0.833***
(2.232) (1.216) (87.685)
mt − 1. .591** −1.371 0.168***
(2.267) (1.050) (6.017)
Nt − 1. 563*** 0.298** 0.013
(3.167) (2.217) (0.275)
Ht − 1. 180 −0.047 0.097***
(0.382) (0.101) (5.864)
Constant −0.052 −0.023 0.118***
(0.984) (0.487) (27.680)
Observations 178 178 178
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.09 0.97
Bootstrap t-statistics in absolute terms in parentheses.
* significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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impact through the transfer of norm is still positive.
5.4 Developing countries
So far, we applied different estimation methods to Equation (1) to get the most consistent
results but we used the sample including both developed and developing countries. Since
the issues of institutions and transfer of norms are more sensitive for developing than for
developed countries, in this section we examine the relevance of our findings to develop-
ing countries. Indeed, developing countries are characterized by two important and dis-
tinct features. First they suffer more from bad institutions and have the most important
progress to make in that area. Second, Diasporas from developing countries are in general
more important and more active, so that the expected feedback effect in terms of transfer
of norms is potentially important.
To this end, we re-run the most consistent regressions identified in the previous sec-
tions on developing countries only. We keep, however, the distinction between total and
skilled migration. Table 8 presents the results in a way similar to Table 3. When the 2SLS
method is applied, we use the same instruments as before. We favor results from the
SURE estimations for institutional dimensions that are not subject to endogeneity issues.
The relevant tests show that they are still strong and valid. In term of comparison between
skilled and total migration the results are broadly similar to the ones with the whole sam-
ple; especially in terms of the magnitude of the effect which is always higher with skilled
migration. We focus on the skilled migration in what follows.
With “Voice and accountability”, the coefficient of skilled emigration is significantly
negative while the one of norms is significantly positive. Higher skilled emigration rate
reduces the voicing capacity at home but allows transferring the quality of norms prevail-
ing in the host country to the home country. In contrast, the coefficients of skilled emi-
gration are significant and positive with “Regulatory quality” and “Control of corruption”.
Note that the latter was not significant with the whole sample. The corresponding
coefficients of the norm are insignificant. This suggests that for the other institu-
tional dimensions, the channel is different from the one prevailing for voice and ac-
countability. For instance, the improvement of corruption might be due to the
business relationships that migrants abroad have with their origin countries. With
more trade and business relationships, there might be an implicit or explicit pres-
sure from abroad to decrease the rate of corrupted activities in the origin country.
Another direct channel might be through remittances and funding of parties. If mi-
grants abroad favor efficient and non corrupted governments, they will be more
likely to send money to individuals or organizations sharing their views and acting
in favor of good governance. As a whole, the results suggest that the channels of
influence from Diasporas on the evolution of institutions are heterogeneous across
the types of institutions.
6. Conclusion
The present paper contributes to the literature on the impact of emigration on the ori-
gin country. It focuses on the impact on institutions. Using bilateral migration data
from and to both developed and developing countries and four indicators of the qual-
ity of institutions (“Voice and accountability”, “Government effectiveness”, “Regulatory











It − 1. .092 0.011 −0.842*** −0.368***
(1.788)* (0.191) (88.782) (5.287)
mt − 1. .876 −0.134 0.046*** 1.482***
(1.145) (0.094) (5.185) (2.493)
Nt − 1. 644* 0.181 −0.045 0.012
(1.684) (0.377) (0.883) (0.089)
Ht − 1. 636 0.996 0.038 2.513***
(0.807) (1.476) (1.475) (2.862)
Constant −0.082 −0.051 0.123*** −0.492
(1.212) (0.827) (27.154) (1.446)
Observations 138 138 138 102
Sargan-test .. .. .. 0.51
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.99 0.28
Skilled migration
It − 1. .084* 0.014 −0.841*** −0.369***
(1.688) (0.260) (88.649) (5.341)
mt − 1. .670* −1.090 0.147*** 3.787**
(1.888) (0.722) (5.132) (2.139)
Nt − 1. 542*** 0.234 −0.049 0.141
(2.654) (1.584) (0.950) (0.856)
Ht − 1. 614 0.997 0.039 2.887***
(0.788) (1.481) (1.510) (3.171)
Constant −0.070 −0.048 0.122*** −0.811*
(1.043) (0.809) (27.055) (1.868)
Observations 138 138 138 102
Sargan-test .. .. .. 0.52
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.05 0.99 0.29
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level, F-test for
testing for weak instruments (>10 means strong instruments); Sargan-test: p-value reported, null hypothesis = validity of
exclusion restriction.
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on the change of the quality of institutions in the origin country. The paper addresses
three specific questions: i) What is the impact of international emigration on the qual-
ity of institutions in the sending country? ii) Is the level of education of emigrants im-
portant for such an impact to take place? and iii) Is a change of the quality of
institution in the home country depends on their quality in the host country?
Using the whole sample of developed and developing countries both as senders and re-
ceivers, we find evidence that total migration affects directly the change in institutions.
The impact is positive for all indicators except “voice and accountability”. In this case the
effect of emigration is negative and significant suggesting that emigration reduces the voi-
cing capacity at home which weakens pressures in favor institutional improvement. Simi-
lar results hold for skilled migration (positive impact for all indicators but “voice and
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http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/9accountability”) but its impact is much higher. Turning to the impact of the host country’s
institutions, we find evidence of positive and significant effects especially when skilled mi-
gration is considered. These results lend support to the hypothesis of transfer of norm
from the host to the home country. All the above results are robust to estimation methods
and sample coverage.
The issues of institutions and transfer of norms being potentially more sensitive for de-
veloping countries, we rerun our estimation on a sample with only developing countries
as senders. The results are broadly similar to the ones with the whole sample. In term of
comparison between skilled and total migration the effects are always higher with skilled
migration. The effect of emigration on “voice and accountability” is negative while the ef-
fect of the norm is positive. The impacts of skilled emigration are positive with “Regula-
tory quality” and “Control of corruption” but the corresponding impacts of norms are non
significant.
Overall, the responses to the three questions above are as follow. International emigra-
tion has an impact on the quality of institutions in the sending country but such an impact
may be positive or negative. The level of education of emigrants is important because the
impacts are higher with skilled than with total migration. Finally, the change of the quality
of institution in the home country depends on their quality in the host country i.e. having
its emigrants located in countries with better quality of institutions benefits the origin
country.Endnotes
1 See (Plaza 2013) for a good summary of the various economic externalities gener-
ated by diasporas.
2 See for instance (Rodrik et al. 2004).
3 See among many others (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) and (Barro 1996).
4 Note, however, that Diasporas don’t always have a positive role in the home coun-
try. It can, for instance, support dictators, fund civil wars or initiate coup
5 Given the low values in terms of variability and given that our approach relies on
cross-sectional analysis, the expected estimation results with these two variables are
problematic. For these reasons, we decided not to report the results with these two in-
dicators. These are however available upon request.
6 Note that the use of 2SLS is equivalent here to Instrumental Variable estimation.
7 The full results are available upon request.
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